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and Coordination Failure 
By  JOHN B.  VAN  HUYCK,  RAYMOND C.  BATTALIO, AND RICHARD 0.  BEIL* 
Deductive equilibrium  methods-such  as 
Rational  Expectations or  Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium-are powerful  tools for analyz- 
ing economies that exhibit  strategic  interde- 
pendence. Typically, deductive equilibrium 
analysis does  not  explain the process by 
which decision makers acquire  equilibrium 
beliefs.  The  presumption is  that  actual 
economies have achieved  a steady state. In 
economies with stable and unique equilib- 
rium points, the influence of  inconsistent 
beliefs and, hence, actions would disappear 
over time, see  Robert Lucas (1987). The 
power of  the  equilibrium  method derives 
from its ability to abstract  from the compli- 
cated dynamic  process  that induces  equilib- 
rium  and to abstract  from  the historical  acci- 
dent that initiated  the process. 
Unfortunately,  deductive  equilibrium 
analysis often fails to determine  a unique 
equilibrium  solution  in many  economies  and, 
hence, often fails to prescribe  or predict  ra- 
tional behavior.  In economies  with multiple 
equilibria,  the rational decision maker for- 
mulating  beliefs using deductive  equilibrium 
concepts  is  uncertain which  equilibrium 
strategy  other decision  makers  will use and, 
when the equilibria  are not interchangeable, 
this uncertainty  will influence the rational 
decision-maker's  behavior. Strategic  uncer- 
tainty arises even in situations  where  objec- 
tives,  feasible strategies, institutions, and 
equilibrium  conventions  are  completely  spec- 
ified  and  are common knowledge. While 
multiple equilibria  are common  in theoreti- 
cal  analysis,  consideration  of  specific 
economies suggests that many equilibrium 
points are implausible and unlikely to be 
observed  in actual  economies. 
One response to multiple  equilibria  is to 
argue  that some Nash equilibrium  points are 
not self-enforcing  and, hence, are implausi- 
ble, because they fail to satisfy  one or more 
of the following refinements:  elimination  of 
individually  unreasonable  actions,  sequential 
rationality, and stability against perturba- 
tions of the game-see  Elon Kohlburg  and 
Jean-Francois  Mertens  (1986) for examples 
and references.  Equilibrium  refinements  de- 
termine when an outcome that is  already 
expected would be implemented  by rational 
decision makers. 
In general,  many outcomes  will satisfy  the 
conditions  of a given  equilibrium  refinement. 
The equilibrium  selection  literature  attempts 
to  determine which, if  any, self-enforcing 
equilibrium  point will be expected.  A satis- 
factory theory of  interdependent  decisions 
must not only identify  the outcomes  that are 
self-enforcing  when expected  but also must 
identify the expected  outcomes.  Consequent- 
ly, a theory of equilibrium  selection would 
be  a  useful complement  to  the theory of 
equilibrium  points. 
The  experimental method  provides a 
tractable and constructive  approach  to the 
equilibrium selection problem. This paper 
studies a  class of  tacit pure coordination 
games with multiple equilibria,  which are 
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strictly  Pareto  ranked,  and it reports  experi- 
ments that provide  evidence  on how human 
subjects  make decisions  under  conditions  of 
strategic  uncertainty. 
I. A Pure  Coordination  Game 
To focus the analysis  consider  the follow- 
ing  tacit  coordination game, which is  a 
strategic  form  representation of  John 
Bryant's  (1983)  Keynesian coordination 
game. The baseline game is defined as fol- 
lows: Let el,...,  en denote the actions  taken 
by n players.  The period  game  A is defined 
by the following payoff function and strat- 
egy space for each of n players: 
(1)  a  (ei,  e1) = a [min(ei, e1)]  -  bei, 
a >  b > O, 
where ei equals  min(el,..., ei_1,  ei+,,...,  en). 
Actions are restricted  to the set of integers 
from  1  to  J.  The  players  have  complete 
information about the payoff function and 
strategy space and know that the payoff 
function and  strategy space are common 
knowledge.' 
If the players could explicitly  coordinate 
their  actions,  the-real  or  imagined 
planner's  decision problem  would be trivial. 
Given  a -  b  greater  than  0,  each  player 
should choose the maximum  feasible  action, 
e. Moreover, a negotiated "pregame" agree- 
ment to choose e- would be self-enforcin*. 
Unlike games with incentive  problems,  here 
the first  best outcome  is an equilibrium  point. 
However,  when the players  cannot  engage  in 
"  pregame"  negotiation  they  face a nontrivial 
coordination  problem. 
Suppose that the players attempt to use 
the Nash equilibrium  concept  to inform  their 
strategic behavior in the tacit coordination 
game A. A player's  best response  to ei is to 
choose ei equal to ei. By symmetry  it follows 
that  any  n-tuple  (e,...,  e)  with  e E {1, 
2,..., e-} satisfies the mutual best response 
property of  a Nash equilibrium  point. All 
feasible actions are potential  Nash equilib- 
rium outcomes. The Nash concept neither 
prescribes  nor predicts  the outcome of this 
tacit coordination  game. 
(Standard  equilibrium  refinements  do not 
reduce  the set of equilibria.  For example,  the 
equilibria are  strict-each  player has  a 
unique best  response-and,  hence, trem- 
bling-hand  perfect.) 
II.  Coordination  Problems  and  Equilibrium 
Selection  Principles 
The analysis in Section  I follows conven- 
tion and abstracts  from the equilibrium  se- 
lection problem.  However,  a rational  player 
using deductive equilibrium  concepts con- 
fronts two nontrivial  coordination  problems 
in period game A. First, players  may fail to 
correctly forecast the  minimum, ei,  and, 
hence, regret  their individual  choice, that is, 
ei = ei. This type of coordination  failure  re- 
sults in disequilibrium:  outcomes  that  do not 
satisfy the mutual  best-response  property  of 
an equilibrium. 
An equilibrium  selection  principle  identi- 
fies a subset of equilibrium  points according 
to some distinctive  characteristic.  An inter- 
esting conjecture  is that decision  makers  use 
some selection  principle  to identify  a specific 
equilibrium point  in  situations involving 
multiple equilibria.  This selection principle 
would solve the problem  of coordinating  on 
a specific  equilibrium  point. Hence, the out- 
come will satisfy the mutual best-response 
property  of an equilibrium. 
A  second  coordination problem arises 
when the equilibria  can be Pareto ranked. 
In  such situations, all players may give a 
best response,  but, nevertheless,  implement  a 
'Apparently, this game is similar to Rousseau's "stag 
hunt" parable, which he used to motivate his analysis of 
the  social  contract,  see  Crawford (1989, p.  4).  In  the 
stag  hunt game, each hunter in a group must allocate 
effort between hunting a stag with the group and hunt- 
ing rabbits by himself. Let e,  denote effort expended on 
the stag hunt. Since stag hunting in that era required the 
coordinated effort of  all  the hunters, the probability of 
successfully hunting a stag depends on the smallest e. 
The parameter a  in equation (1) reflects the benefits of 
participating  in  the  stag hunt: eating well  should  the 
hunt succeed. Hunting rabbits does not require coordi- 
nation  with  the  other  hunters.  The  parameter  b  in 
equation (1) reflects the opportunity cost of effort allo- 
cated to the stag hunt that could have been allocated to 
rabbit hunting: a meal-however,  meager. 236  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  MARCH 1990 
Pareto  dominated  equilibrium, that  is, 
min(el,...,  en) # J. While  not regretting  their 
individual  choice, they  regret  the equilibrium 
implemented by  these individual choices. 
Consequently,  the outcome  results  in coordi- 
nation failure. What equilibrium  selection 
principles  could a player  use to resolve  these 
two coordination  problems?2 
Deductive selection  principles  select equi- 
librium points based on the description  of 
the game. Deductive  selection  principles  pre- 
serve  the  equilibrium method's desirable 
property  of independence  from  historical  ac- 
cidents and from complicated  dynamic  pro- 
cesses. Inductive selection principles  select 
equilibrium  points based on the history of 
some pregame.3  Hence, inductive selection 
principles are not independent  of accident 
and process. 
When multiple equilibrium  points can be 
Pareto ranked,  it is possible  to use concepts 
of  efficiency to  select a  subset of  self- 
enforcing equilibrium  points: examples in- 
clude R. Duncan Luce and Howard  Raiffa's 
(1956, p. 106) concept  of joint-admissibility, 
Tamer Basar and Geert Olsder's  (1982, p. 
72)  concept  of  admissibility, and  John 
Harsanyi  and Reinhard  Selten's  (1988,  p. 81) 
concept of  payoff-dominance.  An  equilib- 
rium  point is said to be payoff-dominant  if it 
is not strictly  Pareto  dominated  by any other 
equilibrium  point. When unique,  considera- 
tions  of  efficiency may induce players to 
focus  on  and,  hence, select  the  payoff- 
dominant equilibrium point,  see  Thomas 
Schelling  (1980, p. 291). 
In period game A, the equilibrium  points 
are  strictly  Pareto ranked. Each  player 
prefers a larger minimum.  The only equi- 
librium point  not  Pareto dominated by 
any other equilibrium  point is the n-tuple 
(e,...,  e):  the  payoff-dominant  equilibrium 
point. Consequently,  payoff-dominance  se- 
lects the n-tuple  (e,...,  e-) in game  A. 
Selecting  the  unique  payoff-dominant 
equilibrium  point not only allows  players  to 
coordinate  on an equilibrium  point but also 
ensures that they will not coordinate  on an 
inefficient  one. Payoff  dominance  solves  both 
the individual and the collective coordina- 
tion problems  of disequilibrium  and coordi- 
nation failure and, as Harsanyi  and Selten 
suggest, should take precedence  over alter- 
native selection  principles. 
The tacit coordination  game  A provides  a 
severe  test of payoff  dominance,  because  the 
minimum rule exacerbates  the influence  of 
uncertainty  about the strategies  of the other 
n -1  players. Define the cumulative  distri- 
bution  function  for a player's  action  as F(e.). 
In  the payoff-dominant  equilibrium,  F&e) 
equals 1 and F(e1) equals  0 for ej less than 
e. A well-known theorem is that if  el,...,  en 
are independent and identically  distributed 
with common cumulative  distribution  func- 
tion F(ej), then the cumulative  distribution 
function for the minimum, F.,n(e), equals 
1- [1 -F(e)];  see  A.  M.  Mood, F.  A. 
Graybill, and  D.  C.  Boes (1974). In  the 
payoff-dominant  equilibrium,  Fmin(e-)  equals 
1 and  Fmin(e) equals 0 for e less than e-.  But 
suppose that a player is uncertain  that the 
n -1  players  will select the payoff-dominant 
action,  J. Specifically, let  F(1) be small but 
greater than 0,  then as n  goes to infinity 
Fmin(l) goes to  1. Consequently,  when the 
number of players is large it only takes a 
remote possibility that an individual  player 
will not select the payoff-dominant  action e- 
to  motivate  defection from  the  payoff- 
dominant  equilibrium. 
Several  deductive  selection  principles 
based on the "riskiness"  of an equilibrium 
point have been identified  and formalized.  A 
maximin action, which is  an action (pure 
strategy)  with the largest  payoff  in the worst 
possible outcome, is  secure, see John Von 
Neumann and  Oskar Morgenstern  (1944, 
1972). Given existence, security  selects the 
equilibrium point  supported by  player's 
maximin actions. Security  may select very 
inefficient  equilibrium  points  in nonzero  sum 
games. 
In period game A, a player  can ensure  a 
payoff  of  a -  b by  choosing  ei  equal to  1, 
which  is the largest  payoff  in the worst  possi- 
2The "disequilibrium  Keynesians"  emphasize  the  first 
coordination  problem. The "equilibrium  Keynesians" 
emphasize  the second  coordination  problem,  see Cooper 
and John (1988) for examples  and references. 
3We  use the term induction  in the logical, rather 
than mathematical,  sense of reasoning  from observed 
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TABLE  1-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A  B  A'  C 
Experiment  Payoff A  Payoff B  Payoff A  Payoff A 
No.  Date  Size  Fullsize  Fullsize  Fullsize  Size Twoa 
1  June  16  1P,  2,...  10  -  -  - 
2  June  16  1P,  2,...,  10P  11,...,15  16  P,...,  20 
3  June  14  1P,2,...  10P  11,...115  16P, ... ,20 
4  Sept  15  1P,  2P,...,  10P  11P,"...  15  16,...,20  21,  ,27 
5  Sept  16  1P,2P"..  ,1OP  11p...,15  16,.,20  21,.,27 
6  Sept  16  lP,2P,..,10lP  11"...,  15  16,  20  21,.,25 
7  Sept  14  1P,  2P,..0. lop  1ip,1... 15  16,...,22  23,...,25 
P-  Denotes  a period in which subjects made predictions. 
- - In experiment 4 and 5 pairings were fixed, while in experiments 6 and 7 pairings were random. 
ble outcome. Consequently,  in this tacit co- 
ordination  game, security  selects  the n-tuple 
(1,...,1).  Since payoff-dominance and secu- 
rity select different  equilibrium  points  in this 
tacit coordination  game (equilibrium  points 
with the highest and lowest payoffs,  respec- 
tively), an important  and tractable  empirical 
question  is which,  if any, deductive  selection 
principle  organizes  the experimental  data. 
It is often possible  to apply  more  than  one 
deductive selection principle to  a  game. 
Hence, subjects may choose disequilibrium 
outcomes unless they behave  as if there  is a 
hierarchy  of selection principles.  When de- 
ductive  selection  principles  fail to coordinate 
beliefs and actions, inductive  selection  prin- 
ciples based on  repeated interaction may 
allow players to learn to coordinate. 
Consider a finitely repeated  game A(T), 
which involves the n players  playing  period 
game A for T periods.  The payoff-dominant 
equilibrium of  A(T)  is just  the repeated 
implementation  of  the  payoff-dominant 
equilibrium  of period game A, because the 
first-best outcome for period game A  is 
(e,...,  e).  Similarly, the  secure equilibrium 
of A(T) is just the repeated  implementation 
of the secure  equilibrium  of period  game  A.4 
Notice that the principles  of efficiency  and 
security can  be  defined independently  of 
equilibrium.  The experiments  in this paper, 
which are designed  to study the conflict  be- 
tween efficiency and security, are not de- 
signed to study how repeated  play of period 
game A  influences the set of  equilibrium 
points for A(T). 
Having t  periods of experience  in A(T) 
provides a  player with observed facts, in 
addition to the description  of the game,  that 
can be used to reason  about  the equilibrium 
selection problem in the continuation  game 
A(T  -  t).  This experience may influence the 
outcome of the continuation  game A(T-  t) 
by focusing expectations  on a specific  equi- 
librium point. For example, one adaptive 
hypothesis is  that players will give a best 
response to  the minimum  observed  in the 
previous  period.  This  adaptive behavior 
would immediately  converge  to an equilib- 
rium in  A(T-1).  The selected equilibrium 
involves all players choosing the period 1 
minimum for the T-  1 periods  of the con- 
tinuation  game A(T -1). 
III. Experimental  Design 
Table 1 outlines the design of the seven 
experiments  reported  in this paper.  The in- 
structions  were read  aloud  to ensure  that the 
description  of the game was common  infor- 
mation,  if not, common  knowledge.'  No pre- 
4Crawford (1989)  emphasizes  that the secure  equilib- 
rium is also the only equilibrium  that is evolutionary 
stable.  In repeated  play,  players  using  adaptive  behavior 
may be led to implement  the secure  equilibrium.  Hence, 
while the experiments  reported  in this paper  discrimi- 
nate sharply  between  strategic  stability  and evolution- 
ary stability,  they do not discriminate  between  learning 
to use security  and certain  kinds  of adaptive  behavior. 
5The original  working  paper,  Van Huyck,  Battalio, 
and Beil (1987),  which  includes  the actual  instructions, 238  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  MARCH 1990 
PAYOFF  TABLE A 
Smallest Value of X Chosen 
7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
Your  7  1.30  1.10  0.90  0.70  0.50  0.30  0.10 
Choice  6  -  1.20  1.00  0.80  0.60  0.40  0.20 
of  5  -  -  1.10  0.90  0.70  0.50  0.30 
X  4  -  -  -  1.00  0.80  0.60  0.40 
3  -  -  -  -  0.90  0.70  0.50 
2  -  -  -  -  -  0.80  0.60 
1  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.70 
PAYOFF  TABLE B 
Smallest Value of X Chosen 
7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
Your  7  1.30  1.20  1.10  1.00  0.90  0.80  0.70 
Choice  6  -  1.20  1.10  1.00  0.90  0.80  0.70 
of  5  -  -  1.10  1.00  0.90  0.80  0.70 
X  4  -  -  -  1.00  0.90  0.80  0.70 
X  3  -  -  -  -  0.90  0.80  0.70 
2  -  -  -  -  -  0.80  0.70 
1  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.70 
play  negotiation was allowed. After each 
repetition  of the period  game,  the minimum 
action was publicly  announced  and the sub- 
jects calculated their earnings  for that pe- 
riod. The only common  historical  data avail- 
able to the subjects  was the minimum. 
During the course  of an experiment  some 
design parameters  were  altered  resulting  in a 
sequence of  treatments  labeled A,  B,  A', 
and C. Instructions  for continuation  treat- 
ments were given to the subjects  after  earlier 
treatments  had been completed.  The feasible 
actions in all treatments  of all experiments 
were the integers 1  through 7:  hence, e 
equaled  7. 
In treatment  A and A', the following  val- 
ues were assigned  to the parameters  in equa- 
tion (1): parameter  a was set equal  to $0.20, 
parameter  b was set equal to $0.10, and a 
constant of $0.60 was added to ensure  that 
all  payoffs were  strictly positive. Conse- 
quently, the  payoff-dominant  equilibrium, 
(7, ...  , 7), paid $1.30 while the secure equilib- 
rium,  (1,...,1),  paid  $0.70  per  subject per 
period.6  Subjects  were  given  this  information 
in  the form of  a payoff table, see payoff 
Table A. In treatment  A, the period  game  A 
was repeated  ten times.  The number  of play- 
ers, n,  varied between 14 and 16 subjects. 
(In treatment  C, the number  of players, n, 
was reduced to two.) Treatment  A' desig- 
nates the resumption  of these conditions  af- 
ter treatment  B. 
In treatment  B, parameter  b in equation 
(1) was set equal to zero,  see payoff  Table  B. 
This gives the subjects  a dominating  strategy 
(play 7 regardless  of the minimum),  which 
eliminates the  coordination  problem. The 
number  of players, n, remained  the same as 
in treatment  A. 
payoff  tables, questionnaire,  extra instructions  and 
record  sheet  used in the experiments  and a more  exten- 
sive analysis of  the experimental  results,  is available 
from the authors  upon request. 
6For the remainder  of this paper, an equilibrium 
denotes a mutual  best-response  outcome in the period 
game. VOL. 80  NO. 1  VAN HUYCK ETAL:  TACIT COORDINATION GAMES  239 
Occasionally,  subjects  were asked to pre- 
dict the actions of  all the subjects in the 
treatment.7 For  each  prediction in  the 
September  experiments,  a subject  was paid 
$0.70 less 0.02 times the sum of the absolute 
value of  the difference  between the actual 
and predicted  actions.  (The rule used in the 
June experiments  was less sensitive  to pre- 
diction errors).  At the end of the experiment, 
the subjects  were told the actual  distribution 
of actions  and were  paid. 
The subjects  were undergraduate  students 
attending  Texas A&M University  and were 
recruited form sophomore  and junior eco- 
nomics courses.  A total of 107 students  par- 
ticipated in  the  seven experiments.  After 
reading the instructions,  but before the ex- 
periment began, the students filled out a 
questionnaire  to determine  that they under- 
stood how to read the payoff  table for treat- 
ment A,  that is, map actions into money 
payoffs. The instructions  would have been 
re-read if needed, but all 107 students re- 
sponded  correctly. 
IV. Experimental  Results 
Table 2  reports the experimental  results 
for treatment  A. The data in period  one are 
particularly  interesting  because the subjects 
can only use deductive  selection  principles  to 
inform their behavior. 
In period  one, the payoff-dominant  action, 
7, was chosen by 31 percent  of the subjects 
(33 of  107) and the secure action, 1, was 
chosen by 2 percent of  the subjects (2 of 
107). Neither deductive selection principle 
succeeds in  organizing  much of  the data, 
although  payoff-dominance  is more success- 
ful than security.  The popularity  of actions  4 
and 5-chosen  by 18 and 34 subjects,  re- 
spectively-is  consistent  with many subjects 
having nearly diffuse  prior  beliefs about the 
outcome of the period  game. 
The initial play of all seven experiments 
exhibit  both individual  and collective  coordi- 
nation failure.  The minimum  action for pe- 
riod one was never greater  than 4. Hence, 
the largest payoff in period one was $1.00 
and some payoffs were $0.10. (The payoff- 
dominant equilibrium  would have paid ev- 
eryone $1.30). All  of  these outcomes are 
inefficient.  The subjects  were unable to use 
any deductive selection  principle  to coordi- 
nate on an equilibrium  point. 
Only 10 percent  of the subjects  predicted 
an equilibrium  outcome in period one. In- 
stead, most subjects  (95 of 106) predicted  a 
disequilibrium  outcome.8  Moreover,  the sub- 
jects' predictions  were dispersed:  one third 
of the subjects  predicted  at least one 1 and 
one 7-a  range  of 6-and  the average  range 
of the predictions  was 4.0. The subjects'  dis- 
persed  predictions  suggest  that  they  expected 
other subjects  to respond  to the payoff  table 
differently than they did. These data are 
inconsistent with any theory  of equilibrium 
selection that assumes  that,  because  a player 
will derive his prior  probability  distribution 
over other players' pure strategies  strictly 
from the parameters  of the game,  all players 
will have the same  prior  probability  distribu- 
tion. Instead,  some subjects  made optimistic 
predictions and some subjects made pes- 
simistic  predictions. 
While the subjects  were  unable  to coordi- 
nate beliefs and actions,  in almost all cases 
their  individual  predictions  and actions  were 
consistent.  Of the 107 subjects,  106 subjects 
predicted that at  least one  other subject 
would choose an action  equal  to or less than 
their choice. (Only one subject  predicted  he 
would determine  the minimum.)  Most sub- 
jects mapped predictions  into actions in a 
reasonable way. Those subjects  who made 
pessimistic  predictions  about what the other 
subjects would do  chose small values for 
their action and subjects who made opti- 
mistic predictions  about  what the other  sub- 
jects would do chose large values for their 
action.9 
7In  two earlier pilot experiments  predictions  were 
not made in any period.  The substantive  results  were 
the same as those reported  here. 
8One subject  is excluded  due to predicting  only 15 
choices. 
9An  anomaly  is that,  of the 95 subjects  who  predicted 
a minimum  less than 7, 87 subjects  chose an action 
greater  than the minimum  they predicted.  Van Huyck, 
Battalio, and Beil (1987) provide an expected value 
model to explain  this anomaly. 240  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  MARCH 1990 
TABLE  2-EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  FOR TREATMENT  A 
Period 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Experiment  1 
No.  of 7's  8  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
No.  of 6's  3  2  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 5's  2  3  2  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
No.of4's  1  6  5  4  1  1  1  0  0  0 
No.  of 3's  1  2  5  5  4  1  1  1  0  1 
No.  of 2's  1  2  2  4  8  7  8  6  4  1 
No.of  l's  0  0  0  2  3  7  5  9  12  13 
Minimum  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 2 
No. of 7's  4  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
No.  of 6's  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 5's  3  3  2  1  0  0  1  1  0  1 
No.  of 4's  4  6  2  3  3  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 3's  1  4  2  5  0  1  1  0  1  0 
No.  of 2's  3  2  6  5  5  9  3  4  3  1 
No.  of l's  0  1  2  2  8  5  11  11  12  13 
Minimum  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 3 
No. of 7's  4  4  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  2 
No. of 6's  2  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of  5's  5  6  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 4's  3  3  2  1  2  1  0  0  0  1 
No.of  3's  0  0  7  6  0  2  3  0  0  0 
No. of 2's  0  1  1  4  5  3  6  3  2  2 
No. of l's  0  0  0  2  5  7  4  11  12  9 
Minimum  4  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 4 
No.  of 7's  6  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
No. of 6's  0  6  2  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.of5's  8  5  5  5  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 4's  1  1  4  6  7  1  2  1  1  0 
No. of 3's  0  2  3  2  4  3  2  2  1  0 
No.  of 2's  0  1  0  0  2  3  7  4  2  2 
No.of  l's  0  0  0  1  2  6  3  8  11  13 
Minimum  4  2  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
An interesting  question  is whether  the sub- 
jects' predictions correspond  to  the actual 
distribution of  actions more closely than 
predictions based on payoff-dominance  or 
security. Using the number  of actions cor- 
rectly  predicted  as a statistic,  the data reveal 
that 95 percent  of the subjects  predicted  the 
actions of  the  other n -1  subjects more 
accurately  than  did  payoff-dominance. 
This statistic is used to measure  prediction 
accuracy  because the subjects  payoff were a 
linear transformation  of the prediction  accu- 
racy score. The difference  of the mean pre- 
diction accuracy score was always positive 
and in most cases significantly  different  from 
zero at the 1 percent  level: a result that is 
robust to  non-parametric  statistical proce- 
dures. Obviously,  security  does even worse. 
Subjects predicted the observed heteroge- 
nous response  to the description  of the game 
and the resulting  coordination  failure  in pe- 
riod one. 
Repeated play of the period game allows 
the subjects  to use inductive  selection  princi- 
ples or to learn to use deductive  selection 
principles. Hence, repeated play makes it 
more likely that subjects will be  able to 
obtain mutual  best-response  outcomes  in the 
continuation game. Repeating the  period 
game does cause actions to converge to a VOL. 80  NO. I  VAN HUYCK ETAL:  TACIT COORDINA  TION GAMES  241 
TABLE  2-EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  FOR  TREATMENT  A, Continued 
Period 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Experiment 5 
No.  of 7's  2  2  3  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 
No.  of 6's  1  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of5's  9  3  0  4  1  0  2  0  0  0 
No. of 4's  3  4  6  2  1  2  0  2  1  1 
No.of3's  1  2  2  4  6  0  0  0  0  1 
No.  of 2's  0  2  2  3  4  6  5  2  5  3 
No. of l's  0  0  2  2  3  7  8  12  10  11 
Minimum  3  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 6 
No. of 7's  5  3  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  3 
No. of 6's  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 5's  5  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 4's  2  3  4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of3's  1  5  4  2  2  2  1  0  2  0 
No.of2's  0  2  4  5  3  3  6  4  5  5 
No.  of l's  1  2  3  8  9  9  7  10  7  8 
Minimum  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 7 
No. of 7's  4  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
No. of 6's  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 5's  2  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No. of 4's  4  0  1  2  1  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of3's  1  3  2  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 2's  1  3  2  2  4  4  4  4  5  3 
No. of l's  1  2  8  8  7  9  9  9  8  10 
Minimum  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
stable outcome, see Table  2. But rather  than 
converging to the payoff-dominant  equilib- 
rium or to the initial outcome  of the treat- 
ment, the most inefficient  outcome obtains 
in all seven experiments. 
The change in a subject's  action between 
period one and period two provides  insight 
into the subjects'  dynamic  behavior.  Of the 
eleven subjects who determined  the mini- 
mum in period one the average  change in 
action between  period  one and two was 0.73:t 
seven subjects increased  their action, three 
did not change, and one decreased  his ac- 
tion. In every experiment  someone  who had 
not determined  the minimum  in period  one 
determines the  minimum in  period two. 
Moreover,  in experiments  one through  five 
the intersection  of the set of subjects  who 
determine  the minimum  in period one with 
the set of subjects  who determine  the min- 
imum in period two is empty. Since a sub- 
ject's  payoff is  increasing  in  ei  when he 
(she) uniquely  determines  the minimum,  this 
adaptive  behavior  can be rationalized. 
However, a subject's  payoff is decreasing 
in ei when he (she) played above the mini- 
mum and those subjects  that played above 
the minimum  reduced  their  choice  of action. 
The observed mean reduction  is increasing 
in the difference  between a subject's  action 
and the reported minimum,  and the mean 
reduction  is smaller  than this difference.  The 
observed correlation between the  current 
choice of these optimistic  subjects  and the 
minimum  reported  in period 1 suggests  that 
behavior in the continuation  game A(9) is 
not independent  of the history  leading  up to 
continuation game A(9). However,  only 14 
of 107 subjects give a best-response  to the 
period one minimum  in period  two. 
Some subjects  play below the minimum  of 
the preceding period. This observed  "over- 
shooting" cannot be reconciled  with adap- 
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will be a convex combination  of last periods 
action and last periods  outcome.  Apparently, 
some  subjects learn how "risky" it  is  to 
choose an action other than the secure ac- 
tion, 1, under  the minimum  rule  and learn  to 
use security to inform their behavior  in the 
continuation  game. 
Although it  failed to  predict the initial 
outcome, security predicts the stable out- 
come of period game A. By period ten 72 
percent  of the subjects  (77 out of 107) adopt 
their secure action, 1, and the minimum  for 
all seven experiments  was a 1. The observed 
coordination  failure  appears  to result  from  a 
few subjects  concluding  it is too "risky"  to 
choose an action other than the secure ac- 
tion and from most subjects  focusing  on the 
minimum reported  in earlier  period games. 
The minimum  rule interacting  with this dy- 
namic behavior  causes  this treatment  to con- 
verge to the most inefficient  outcome. 
In treatment  B, parameter  b of equation 
(1) was set equal to zero. Because  a player's 
action is  no  longer penalized, the payoff- 
dominant action, 7, is a best response  to all 
feasible  minimums.  Action 7 is a dominating 
strategy. Hence, treatment  B  tests equilib- 
rium refinements  based  on the elimination  of 
individually unreasonable  actions. For ex- 
ample, a simple dominance  argument  elimi- 
nates all of  the equilibrium  points except 
one:  (7,.. .,  7).  Any  strategic uncertainty 
would cause an individually  rational  player 
to choose the payoff-dominant  action,  7. 
Table 3 reports the experimental  results 
for treatment  B and treatment  A'. In period 
eleven, the payoff-dominant  action, 7, was 
chosen by 84 percent  of the subjects  (76 of 
91). However,  the minimum  in period  eleven 
was never more than 4 and in experiments 
four, five, six, and seven  it was a 1.10 
Of course, a subject  that adopts action 7 
need not worry about what actions other 
subjects take and, apparently,  most subjects 
did not. This property  of dominating  strate- 
gies resulted in the B  treatment  exhibiting 
different dynamics than the A  treatment. 
Like the A  treatment, those players who 
determine the minimum  increase their ac- 
tion, but, unlike the A treatment,  those  play- 
ers who were above the minimum  do not 
decrease  their action.11  This dynamic  behav- 
ior converges  to the efficient  outcome-the 
payoff-dominant  equilibrium-in four  of the 
six experiments.  By period  fifteen,  96 percent 
of  the subjects chose the payoff-dominant 
action, 7. 
Even in the experiments  that obtained  the 
efficient outcome, the B  treatment  was not 
sufficient  to induce the groups  to implement 
the  payoff-dominant  equilibrium  in  treat- 
ment  A':  parameter  b  equals $0.10 once 
again. Returning  to the original  payoff  table 
in period sixteen, 25 percent  of the subjects 
chose the payoff-dominant  action,  7.12 How- 
ever, 37 percent chose the secure  action, 1. 
Period sixteen predictions  were peaked  with 
subjects choosing a 7 predicting  most sub- 
jects would choose 7 and subjects  choosing  a 
1 predicting  most subjects  would choose 1. 
This bi-modal distribution  of  actions and 
predictions  suggests  that  play prior  to period 
sixteen influenced  subjects'  behavior.  How- 
ever, the subjects  exhibit a heterogenous  re- 
sponse to this history. 
Security predicts the stable outcome of 
treatment  A'. In treatment  A', the minimum 
in all periods of all six experiments  was 1. 
By period twenty, 84 percent  of the subjects 
chose the secure action, 1, and 94 percent 
chose an  action less than or equal to  2. 
(Experiments  two and four even satisfy the 
10At least  one  subject did  not  understand how  the 
payoff  table had  changed. Subject 3  in  experiment 5, 
who  plays  a  1  in  every  period  of  the  B  treatment, 
predicts  that  all  16 players will choose  1 but only  he 
does  so.  When  the  actual  distribution  was  revealed, 
subject  3  appeared  genuinely  amazed  and  confessed 
that  he  had  not  understood  how  the  payoffs  had 
changed. 
"1The two exceptions were due to subject 3 in experi- 
ment  five, see fn.  10, and subject 12 in experiment six. 
Subject 12 predicts that he will uniquely determine the 
minimum  in  period  11,  verifies this in  period  12  by 
choosing  a 3, and then chooses a one for the remainder 
of  the B  treatment. Perhaps, subject 12 became vindic- 
tive. He had chosen a 7 in period 1. 
12The  large  fluctuations in  behavior resulting from 
changes in the parameter b -between  treatment A and 
B  and between treatment B and A'-suggest  that sub- 
jects  are influenced by  the description of  the game. In 
our  view,  these  data  are inconsistent  with  backward- 
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TABLE  3-EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS  FOR TREATMENT  B AND  TREATMENT A' 
Treatment B  Treatment A' 
11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
Experiment 2 
No.of  7's  13  15  16  16  16  8  2  0  0  0 
No.  of 6's  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No. of 5's  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.of  4's  1  0  0  0  0  1  2  0  0  0 
No. of 3's  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  0 
No.  of 2's  0  0  0  0  0  3  3  4  2  0 
No.of  l's  0  0  0  0  0  2  8  11  13  16 
Minimum  3  5  7*  7*  7*  1  1  1  1  1* 
Experiment 3 
No.  of 7's  13  13  12  13  14  6  2  2  1  1 
No.  of 6's  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 5's  0  0  1  0  0  0  2  1  0  0 
No.  of 4's  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1 
No.  of 3's  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 2's  0  0  0  0  0  2  4  2  3  0 
No.  of l's  0  0  0  0  0  4  6  9  10  12 
Minimum  4  3  5  6  7*  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 4 
No. of 7's  12  13  14  14  15  3  1  0  0  0 
No.  of 6's  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of5's  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 4's  0  1  1  0  0  2  0  0  0  0 
No. of 3's  0  1  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0 
No. of 2's  0  0  0  0  0  2  1  2  0  0 
No.of  l's  2  0  0  0  0  6  13  13  15  15 
Minimum  1  3  4  5  7*  1  1  1  1*  1* 
Experiment 5 
No.  of 7's  13  13  15  15  15  1  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 6's  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of5's  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  O  0 
No.  of 4's  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 3's  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0 
No.  of 2's  0  0  0  0  0  3  4  2  2  3 
No.ofl's  1  1  1  1  1  11  11  14  14  13 
Minimum  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 6 
No.of  7's  13  13  12  12  13  2  2  2  2  2 
No.  of 6's  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of  S's  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 4's  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 3's  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No. of 2's  1  0  0  0  1  5  6  7  6  5 
No.  of l's  1  0  1  1  1  7  8  7  8  9 
Minimum  1  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 7 
No.  of 7's  12  14  13  13  14  3  4  2  2  2 
No.  of 6's  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.of  S's  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
No.of  4's  1  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0 
No.of  3's  0  0  0  1  0  2  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 2's  0  0  0  0  0  2  4  2  2  1 
No.of  l's  1  0  0  0  0  4  6  10  10  11 
Minimum  1  7*  6  3  7*  1  1  1  1  1 
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mutual  best-response  property  of an equilib- 
rium by period twenty.)  Obtaining  the effi- 
cient outcome in treatment  B failed to re- 
verse the observed  coordination  failure.  Like 
the A  treatment, the most inefficient  out- 
come obtained. 
V. Experimental  Results  for  Treatment  C: 
Group  Size Two 
Treatment  C was added  to the September 
experiments to  determine  if  subjects were 
influenced  by group  size when  choosing  their 
actions. In theory,  any uncertainty  about  the 
actions of an individual  player  in the game  is 
exacerbated by  the minimum rule as  the 
number  of players  increases,  see Section II. 
The C treatment  reduces  group  size to two. 
Table 4  reports the experimental  results 
for the C treatment  of experiments  four  and 
five, which permanently  paired  subjects  with 
an unknown partner.  In period twenty-one, 
42 percent of the subjects  play their  payoff- 
dominant action, 7, and 74 percent of the 
subjects  increase  their  action.  This result  oc- 
curred even though the minimum  for the 
preceding  five periods  had been a 1 and all 
31 subjects had played either a 1 (28 sub- 
jects) or a 2 (3 subjects)  in period twenty. 
Clearly,  either  the subjects  thought  that  their 
partner in  treatment C  would change his 
(her) action in response to reduced group 
size or the subjects  expected  alternative  dy- 
namics  in repeated  play. 
The subjects  in experiments  four and five 
used an adaptive behavior  in the C  treat- 
ment similar  to the adaptive  behavior  exhib- 
ited in the A treatment.  Subjects  that played 
the minimum  increased  effort  by an average 
of  +2.0  and subjects  that played above the 
minimum rediced effort by an average  of 
-  1.9. However,  unlike  the  A treatment,  there 
was no ".overshooting" to the secure  action, 
1.  Occasionally, both  subjects simultane- 
ously chose the payoff-dominant  action,  7V13 
This dynamic  behavior  converged  to the ef- 
ficient outcome-the  payoff-dominant  equi- 
librium-in  12 of 14 trails.  Hence,  even  with 
an extremely negative history payoff-domi- 
nance predicts the stable outcome of  the 
tacit coordination  game  with  fixed  pairs. 
Experiments six  and  seven  randomly 
paired subjects  with an unknown  partner.'4 
Hence,  experiments six  and  seven  test 
whether  the results  obtained  in Experiments 
four and five were due to subjects  repeating 
the period game with the same  opponent.  In 
the first  period of these  experiments,  37 per- 
cent of the subjects  chose the payoff-domi- 
nant action, 7, and 73 percent  of the subjects 
increased  their choice of action,  see Table 5. 
Moreover, the subjects' dynamic behavior 
was similar  to that found in the fixed  pair C 
treatment.  While the results  for the random 
pair C  treatment are influenced  by group 
size, no stable  outcome  obtains. 
The C treatment  confirms  that there are 
two consequences  of the minimum  rule.  First, 
group  size interacting  with the minimum  rule 
alters the subjects'  initial choice of action. 
Second,  group  size interacting  with the mini- 
mum rule alters the convergence  of the sub- 
jects' dynamic  behavior  in disequilibrium. 
13Recall  that subjects only observe the minimum and 
their own action. Hence, it is not possible to unilaterally 
"signal"  a  willingness  to  implement the payoff-domi- 
nant  equilibrium,  that  is,  subjects could  not  use  Os- 
borne's  (1987)  refinement of  a "convincing deviation" 
to inform their behavior, see also van Damme (1987). 
14Experiments  by  Cooper,  DeJong,  Forsythe,  and 
Ross  (1987)  report  that  after  eleven  repetitions  ran- 
domly  paired groups of  size two almost always obtain 
the  payoff-dominant  equilibrium.  However,  Cooper 
et al. also report coordination failure when subjects can 
choose  from a strategy space that includes certain kinds 
of  dominated  cooperative strategies. Their game illus- 
trates  an  interesting  distinction  between  Luce  and 
Raiffa's "solution in the strict sense," which depends on 
joint-admissibility  and Harsanyi and Selten's solution, 
which  depends  on  payoff-dominance.  Because  the 
first-best outcome  requires using a  strictly dominated 
strategy-as  in  the prisoner's dilemma game-and  be- 
cause joint-admissibility  admits efficiency comparisons 
with  disequilibrium outcomes,  the Cooper et  al. game 
with dominated cooperative strategies has no "solution 
in  the  strict  sense"  of  Luce  and  Raiffa. Because  the 
first-best outcome  is an equilibrium in period game A, 
joint-admissibility-appropriately  defined for n person 
games-and  payoff-dominance select the same equilib- 
rium point in period game A. VOL. 80  NO. 1  VAN HUYCK ETAL.:  TACIT COORDINATION GAMES  245 
TABLE  4-EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  FOR  TREATMENT  C: 
FIXED PAIRINGS 
Period 
21  22  23  24  25  26  27 
Experiment 5 
Pair 1 
Subject 1  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Subject l6  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  7*  7*  7*  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Pair 2 
Subject 2  7  2  7  7  7  7  7 
Subject 15  1  7  3  6  7  7  7 
Minimum  1  2  7  7  7  7  7 
Pair 3 
Subject 3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Subject 14  1  1  7  1  1  1  7 
Minimum  1*  1*  1  1*  1*  1*  1 
Pair 4 
Subject 4  1  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Subject 13  7  2  5  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  1  2  5  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Pair 5 
Subject 5  1  7  4  7  7  7  7 
Subject 12  1  4  7  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  1  4  4  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Pair 6 
Subject6  5  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Subject 11  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  5  7*  7*  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Pair 7 
Subject 7  1  7  6  7  7  7  7 
Subject 10  5  3  6  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  1  3  6*  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Pair 8 
Subject 8  7  6  6  7  7  7  7 
Subject 9  3  5  7  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  3  5  6  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Experiment 6 
Pair 1 
Subject 2  7  7  4  5  6  6  7 
Subject 15  2  3  6  6  7  7  7 
Minimum  2  3  4  5  6  6  7* 
Pair 2 
Subject 3  5  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Subject 14  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  5  7*  7*  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Pair 3 
Subject 4  1  1  1  1  4  4  1 
Subject 13  7  1  1  3  1  1  2 
Minimum  1  1*  1*  1  1  1  1 
Pair 4 
Subject 5  5  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Subject 12  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
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TABLE  4-FIXED  PAIRINGS, Continued 
Period 
21  22  23  24  25  26  27 
Pair  5 
Subject  6  4  5  7  7  7  7  7 
Subject  11  4  5  7  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  4*  5*  7*  7*  7*  7*  7* 
Pair  6 
Subject  7  5  7  7  7  7  7  7 
SubjectlO  5  7  7  7  7  7  7 
Minimum  5*  7*  7*  7*  7*  7*  7* 
*  Denotes a mutual  best-response  outcome. 
TABLE 5-DISTRIBUTION  OF ACTIONS  FOR TREATMENT  C: 
RANDOM  PAIRINGS 
Period 
21  22  23  24  25 
Experiment  6 
No.  of 7's  5  5  4  10  8 
No.  of 6's  0  1  3  0  0 
No.  of 5's  2  5  3  3  4 
No.  of 4's  3  1  1  1  1 
No.  of 3's  1  1  1  0  0 
No.  of 2's  1  1  2  2  2 
No.  of l's  4  2  2  0  1 
Experiment 7 
No. of 7's  -  -  6  5  5 
No. of 6's  -  -  1  0  1 
No. of 5's  -  -  0  3  0 
No. of 4's  -  -  2  1  4 
No. of 3's  -  -  2  0  0 
No. of 2's  -  -  0  0  1 
No.  of l's  -  -  3  5  3 
VI. Treatment  A with  Monitoring 
As a referee  points out, a reasonable  con- 
jecture is that revealing  the distribution  of 
actions each period-in  addition  to the min- 
imum-might  influence  the reported  dynam- 
ics.  For example, subjects could signal a 
willingness to  coordinate on  the  payoff- 
dominant equilibrium  and optimistic sub- 
jects  might delay reducing their action if 
they knew the minimum  was determined  by 
just one subject.  Two experiments,  each us- 
ing payoff Table A  and 16 naive subjects, 
were conducted  in which  the entire  distribu- 
tion of actions  was recorded  on a blackboard 
at the end of each period  and was left there 
for the entire  experiment. 
The initial distribution  of actions  and the 
dynamics  of the two monitoring  experiments 
were similar to  those reported above, see 
Table 6.  If  anything, the convergence  of 
actions to  the secure action, 1, was more 
rapid under the monitoring  treatment.  In 
fact, a  mutual best-response  outcome was 
obtained in one experiment:  without moni- 
toring mutual best-response  outcomes are 
not observed  for period  game A until treat- 
ment A'. Apparently,  monitoring  helps solve 
the individual  coordination  problem-more 
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TABLE  6-DISTRIBUTION  OF ACTIONS  FOR  TREATMENT  A WITH MONITORING 
Period 
1P  2P  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  lop 
Experiment 8 
No.of7's  4  0  0  0  2  0  0  1  1  1 
No.  of 6's  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 5's  4  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  1 
No.  of 4's  5  4  2  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
No.  of 3's  1  4  1  0  0  2  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 2's  0  2  1  2  3  2  1  1  2  1 
No.  of l's  1  5  11  13  11  11  14  14  13  13 
Minimum  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Experiment 9 
No.  of 7's  6  2  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No.  of 6's  1  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
No. of 5's  2  2  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
No.  of 4's  4  2  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  1 
No.  of 3's  1  5  3  1  0  0  0  0  1  0 
No.  of 2's  0  1  0  5  4  1  0  0  1  2 
No.  of l's  2  2  9  8  12  15  16  15  14  13 
Minimum  1  1  1  1  1  1  1*  1  1  1 
P-  Denotes  a period in which subjects made predictions. 
* -  Denotes  a mutual best-response outcome. 
not the collective  coordination  problem-the 
minimum  was a 1 in all ten periods  of both 
experiments. 
VII. Concluding  Comments 
These experiments  provide  an interesting 
example of coordination  failure.  The mini- 
mum was never above four in period one 
and all seven experiments  converged  to  a 
minimum  of one within four periods.  Since 
the payoff-dominant  equilibrium  would  have 
paid all subjects $19.50 in the A  and A' 
treatments-excluding predictions-and the 
average earnings were only $8.80, the ob- 
served behavior cost  the  average subject 
$10.70 in lost earnings. 
This inefficient  outcome  is not due to con- 
flicting  objectives  as in "prisoner's  dilemma" 
games or to  asymmetric  information  as in 
"moral  hazard"  games.  Rather,  coordination 
failure results from  strategic  uncertainty: 
some subjects  conclude  that it is too "risky" 
to  choose the payoff-dominant  action and 
most subjects focus on outcomes  in earlier 
period games.  The minimum  rule  interacting 
with this dynamic  behavior  causes  the A and 
A' treatments  to converge  to the most inef- 
ficient  outcome. 
Deductive methods  imply that all feasible 
actions are consistent  with some equilibrium 
point  in  this  experimental coordination 
game.  However, the  experimental  results 
suggest that the first-best  outcome,  which is 
the payoff-dominant  equilibrium,  is an ex- 
tremely unlikely outcome either initially or 
in repeated  play. Instead,  the results  suggest 
that the initial outcome  will not be an equi- 
librium  point and only the secure-but very 
inefficient-equilibrium describes behavior 
that actual subjects  are likely to coordinate 
on in repeated  play of period  game A when 
the number  of players  is not small. 
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